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Abstract 
A large body of research in economics, information systems and marketing has sought to 
understand sources of price dispersion. Previous empirical work has mainly offered consumer 
and/or product based explanations for this phenomenon. In contrast, our research explores the key 
role played by vendors’ price-format adoption in explaining price dispersion. We empirically 
analyze half-million online and offline prices offered by major U.S. airlines in the top 500 
domestic markets. Our study shows that a vendor’s price-format remains an important source of 
price dispersion in both channels even after accounting for other factors known to impact 
dispersion in airline ticket prices. Importantly, this finding is true for both transacted and posted 
tickets.  We document several other interesting empirical findings. First, the lower variance in the 
prices of EDLP firms serves to reduce the market-level dispersion in prices when such firms are 
present. Moreover, the price variance of non-EDLP firms in these markets is also lower than in 
those markets in which EDLP competitors are absent.  Second, we also find that dispersion in 
offered prices increases closer to the departure date, which is consistent with theoretical assertion 
that price dispersion increases with reservation prices.  Finally, we continue to observe dispersion 
of online prices even after accounting for vendor strategy and other known sources of dispersion, 
suggesting that the prices are unlikely to converge even in the presence of sophisticated online 
search mechanisms. 
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1. Introduction 
Price dispersion studies can provide rich insights into the prevailing market conditions and are of 
particular relevance to vendors following market segmentation and price discrimination strategies. While 
the price dispersion phenomenon is fundamental to any competitive market, the advent of the Internet and 
the emergence of online markets for many goods and services have led to renewed interest in this topic.  
The popular view is that the Internet lowers consumer search costs and alleviates a host of information 
asymmetry issues, leading to near convergence in prices (Bakos 1997). However, empirical studies show 
that markets, electronic or otherwise, demonstrate significant dispersion in prices even after taking into 
account many other known sources of price dispersion (see Pan, et al. 2004 for a compressive discussion). 
An important goal of our current research is to add to the understanding of price dispersion in both online 
and offline markets. Our work goes beyond the consumer and/or product-related explanation of price 
dispersion offered by past empirical research, and examines the key role played by vendor’s price-format 
strategies. 
Literature in marketing suggests that the proactive choice of a particular “price-format” can 
position a firm to attract certain types of consumers in the marketplace (Bell and Lattin 1998).  Price-
formats are not necessarily conveyed by the prices of individual goods, but rather reflect the overall 
pricing strategy of a firm.  Thus firms may convey a certain image about themselves through price 
structures alone.  For example, it is believed that consumers attach a certain price image to prices ending 
in 9 (e.g., 4449, 9999) and several retail outlets position themselves as “value priced” by only stocking 
products priced lower than $0.99.  Other classic price-formats that firms can adopt are “everyday low 
price” (EDLP) and “promotional pricing,” or HILO/PROMO, strategies. While the former strategy 
promises lower average prices, the HILO/PROMO strategy uses deep price cuts on certain featured 
products to attract consumers.  Note that simply practicing a certain price-format may not always 
successfully lead to the creation of a corresponding price image in the minds of the consumer – that 
depends on the consumers’ ability to see and compare other prices as well.  However, such vendor 
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strategies are quite likely to influence the dispersion of prices posted in a market.  Moreover, if successful, 
these pricing strategies are also likely to affect the dispersion of transacted prices that eventually clear in 
the market. However, extant research has not examined the impact of such firm pricing strategies on the 
dispersion of either posted or transacted prices.  
Hence, an important objective of our current research is to empirically examine whether and how 
vendors’ choice of price-formats contributes to price dispersion in a market. We are particularly interested 
in investigating what happens to price dispersion when two or more firms with different price-format 
strategies compete in the same market.  We also seek to empirically test two other questions: First,   is the 
extent of dispersion in transacted and posted prices the same and, if not, do price-formats explain these 
differences? Second, how do consumers’ reservation prices affect the extent to which prices are 
dispersed?  Answers to both these questions can shed light on prior theoretical assertions on price 
dispersion. 
To answer these questions, we study the U.S. domestic airline market.  The airline market 
provides an ideal setting for this research not only because the same firms participate in both online and 
offline channels, but because at least two of these firms are self-declared practitioners of the EDLP 
strategy, while most of the other firms adopt a non-EDLP strategy.  The U.S. airline industry has been 
extensively studied by researchers in economics, and to some extent by those in IS and marketing as well 
and, therefore, our empirical analysis carefully controls for the well-known determinants of price-
dispersion (e.g., market factors and ticket characteristics) identified by previous research. 
We have two datasets that cover the same three-month period corresponding to the 3rd quarter of 
2004.  The first dataset has a total of 1,137,500 individual tickets posted by fourteen network carriers and 
three regional airlines that together account for over 86% of all domestic passenger enplanements in the 
U.S. and is a near comprehensive list of all online airfares posted by both online travel agents as well 
individual airline web sites.  We put together this dataset by developing intelligent Web-agents scripted in 
open source languages that routinely pulled data for all origin-destination pairs in the U.S..  The second 
dataset was obtained from the Origin and Destination Survey that is managed by the U.S. Bureau of 
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Transportation Statistics.  This dataset is a 10% sample of all airline tickets transacted in the U.S., which 
includes both online and offline modes of purchase.  Thus, while the former data contains posted prices, 
the latter contains transacted prices, and is the standard dataset for empirical airline research in 
economics.  After narrowing down the specific markets and ticket-types for analyses, we have between 
200,000- 250,000 individual tickets for each data set. 
We develop and estimate a hierarchical linear model that relates price dispersion to its underlying 
determinants while accounting for the partial dependence among prices due to market- or airline-specific 
factors.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literatures on 
price dispersion and pricing in the airline industry and develops a set of testable hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data and model, and presents the results of our empirical analyses. The paper concludes with 
a discussion of the results, the limitations of the study, as well as avenues for future research. 
2. Sources of Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry 
Three streams of research inform this work. First, a rich history of both theoretical and empirical research 
in economics has shown how various product, consumer, and market factors affect equilibrium prices and 
price dispersion in a market. Second, a significant body of research has identified the important factors 
influencing price dispersion in the airline industry. Finally, a relatively new and emerging stream of 
information systems (IS) research has studied the nature of online price dispersion.  Indeed, recent IS 
research suggests that product, retailer and market characteristics should be considered jointly to 
understand market-level dispersion of prices (Venkatesan, et al. 2006).  Our empirical models of price 
dispersion not only weave together findings from each stream, but contribute to the extant literature by 
examining the impact of vendors’ price-format strategies. 
The U.S. airline industry comprises fourteen major domestic network airlines that operate from 
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seventy-nine cities and compete in over two thousand routes or markets1.  The existing literature has 
studied various elements of this industry, including pricing at the customer end and operational aspects, 
such as hub-and-spoke management at the backend (Berry, et al. 1997, Borenstein 1989, Brueckner, et al. 
1992).  Further, there has also been a steady stream of work that has specifically examined the various 
sources of heterogeneity in airline pricing (e.g. Borenstein and Rose 1994), which are briefly reviewed 
below and are also incorporated into our empirical analysis. 
2.1 Ticket category 
In his seminal paper, Varian (1998, p.651) observes that “… the ‘law of one price’ is no law at all”.  This 
observation implies that even the prices of relatively homogeneous products are unlikely to converge in a 
market with heterogeneous consumers.  Moreover, product homogeneity is itself a theoretical concept that 
may be impossible to observe in real-world markets, such as in airline travel.  Indeed, products are 
differentiated in many ways based upon differences in consumers’ tastes and preferences (Hotelling 1929, 
Salop 1979), differences in quality (Mussa and Rosen 1978), or differences in the services that encompass 
the core product (Chellappa and Kumar 2005) such as shopping experience, convenience, delivery, and 
return policies (Smith, et al. 2000). Thus, the features and prices of two airline tickets may be very 
different even if they are both issued for the same route and on the same day.   One important source of 
differentiation between two airline tickets for the same route is whether or not there are Saturday-night 
stay requirements (Clemons, et al. 2002, Dana 1998).  Dana (1998) and Gale and Holmes (1993) have 
suggested that air carriers impose Saturday-night stay-over ticket restrictions to discriminate between 
business and leisure consumers, where business consumers are less elastic with respect to days of travel.    
Therefore, before we examine the impact of price-format strategies on dispersion, it is important to 
account for dispersion due to ticket types.  While one way to achieve this is to simply include a fixed 
                                                 
1 Note that in the airline industry, each route or unique origin-destination pair is referred to as a market; i.e. the route 
San Francisco – Los Angeles would be considered a market.  However, following Borenstein (1989), Brueckner 
(1992), Borenstein and Rose (1994), and Berry et al. (1997), we adopt an even more rigorous definition of market by 
considering the directional component of the route as well (e.g., LAX-SFO is not the same as SFO-LAX), where the 
directional distinction is related to where the passenger originates in the outbound itinerary. 
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effect for business/leisure tickets over all tickets, another approach is to conduct our empirical analysis 
separately on each sub-sample.  An advantage of the latter approach is that it directly identifies the impact 
of different factors on price dispersion in each ticket category without relying on complicated interaction 
effects.   For example, if we account for the same set of variables for both ticket categories, and if the 
intercept is different in the two cases, then we know that the baseline dispersion itself is different.  Since 
the two ticket categories are targeted towards two different segments, and because airlines price 
discriminate between the two categories, we should expect that the resulting distribution of ticket prices 
available in each category is different. 
Hypothesis 1: Business (tickets with no weekend-stay restriction) and leisure (tickets with 
weekend-stay restrictions) tickets exhibit different levels of price dispersion. 
However, Stigler (1961, p.214) observes, “… a portion of the observed dispersion is presumably 
attributable to such differences.  But it would be metaphysical, and fruitless, to assert that all dispersion 
is due to heterogeneity.”   Hence for each ticket category, we further account for other known and 
unknown factors that may influence price dispersion. 
2.2 Market characteristics 
In the airline industry, a market refers to the route or origin-destination pair of airports, whose intrinsic 
characteristics will likely impact an individual firm’s pricing and hence overall price dispersion in the 
market. For example, firms might vary in how they price based on the distance between the origin and 
destination, thus leading to price dispersion. Similarly, prior research suggests that other route-related 
factors such as the number of slots available at an airport (a form of capacity constraint) and the number 
of airlines competing on a route also impact prices and, therefore, price dispersion (Berry 1990, 
Borenstein 1989, Borenstein and Rose 1994, Fournier and Zuehlke 2004, Morrison and Winston 1990, 
Neels 2000).    We include three important variables suggested by extant research to account for price 
dispersion due to differences in market concentration, slot capacity and distance.    
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Market concentration is a measure of the degree of competition on a route, and has been 
operationalized in two different ways.  Borenstein and Rose (1994) use the concept of “density”, 
measured by the total number of flights on the observed route, and flight Herfindahl to capture market 
concentration.  Hayes and Ross (1998) and Stavins (2001), on the other hand, use the number of carriers 
offering services in each route as an alternative measure of market competition.   We adopt this latter 
measure as it is appropriate to the models2 that we consider.  Stavins (2001, p.202) finds that “price 
discrimination is higher on routes with more competition,” implying that higher market concentration 
leads to a greater variety of prices.  On the other hand, it is also possible that due to multimarket effects 
and tacit understanding, firms may not tend to undercut each other in very competitive conditions; which 
suggests that prices will converge when market concentration is high.  While there is evidence that mean 
prices are higher when market concentration is high (Fournier and Zuehlke 2004), the latter’s impact on 
price dispersion can be ambiguous (Borenstein and Rose 1994).  Since market concentration varies across 
routes, it is important to control for the influence of this variable on price dispersion. 
 The variable slot measures the extent to which one or both the endpoint airports are congested.  
Currently there are four slot-constrained airports in the domestic air transportation market in the U.S.: 
Chicago O’Hare (ORD), Kennedy (JFK) and La Guardia (LGA) in New York City, and Washington 
National (DCA).  The opportunity cost of operating in slot-constrained airports is higher and hence higher 
prices are expected if one or both endpoints of a route are slot-constrained.  Prior studies find mixed 
results on the relationship between slot and price; while Berry et al. (1997) and Fournier and Zuehlke 
(2004) find a positive relationship, Stavins (2001) finds that the effect of slot on price is negative after 
controlling for Saturday-night stay-over and advance-purchase requirements.  While the impact of slot-
constraints on price dispersion has not been directly examined in previous work,  Escobari and Gan 
                                                 
2 Total number of flights suffers from collinearity problems with flight frequency, thus it is not adopted in our 
analysis.  Further, the number of carriers serving a route is preferable because it highly (and negatively) correlates 
with three Herfindahl measures – flight Herfindahl (-0.69), origination Herfindahl (-0.73), and route Herfindahl (-
0.62) – while providing better fit to the models. 
Chellappa, Sin, and Siddarth: Price Image as a Source of Price Dispersion 
 
 8 
(2007) suggest that costly capacity constraints will reduce price dispersion, which implies that slot-
constrained routes should have lower price dispersion. 
Finally, the variable costs of operating a flight are directly associated with flight distance between 
the two endpoint airports; hence higher prices are expected for flights with longer distance (Borenstein 
1989).  On the other hand, the total distance of a flight varies by intermediate point (Hayes and Ross 
1998).  As the distance covered by a flight increases, the carrier can choose from a greater number   of 
intermediate airports and potentially generate greater economies of scale.  Empirical findings from prior 
research suggest that cost  is the dominant factor  that explains the relationship between distance and price 
(Berry, et al. 1997, Borenstein 1989, Stavins 2001).   Thus if the dominant effect of distance is in the form 
of cost or capacity, then once again we should observe low price dispersion (Escobari and Gan 2007); on 
the other hand, if longer distances provide greater possibilities for the firms, then we should observe 
greater price discrimination and hence greater dispersion. 
Hypothesis 2: Characteristics of a market (route), such as its market concentration, slot capacity, 
and distance, are important sources of price dispersion. 
2.3 Firm differences and market power 
Price-differences are often attributed to the relative market power of sellers. In many physical goods 
industries this is manifested in brand-image, where consumers are known to pay higher prices at branded-
retailers (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). In the airline industry, differences in market power can arise 
from differences in route structures.  For example, most airlines are based on the hub-and-spoke system in 
which the hubs are central to how planes are maintained and flight crews organized (Berry, et al. 1997, 
Borenstein 1989, Brueckner, et al. 1992).  Airlines often prefer to route their flights through hubs because 
of the increased flexibility that comes from centralized operations at particular airports. An airline can 
exercise greater market power over flights that originate/end at a hub because their control over airport 
resources helps them offer superior services, such as more convenient gates and better departure times 
(Borenstein 1989), which may be valuable to business and other less price-sensitive travelers. In addition, 
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hubs have the potential to increase entry barriers and drive up prices for hub-originating passengers, and 
have been used as a price mark-up proxy in previous research (e.g. Hayes and Ross (1998)). While cost 
efficiencies of hubs can potentially lead to lower prices, prior research suggests that firms typically 
exercise their market power and charge higher prices at hub airports (Borenstein 1989).  A follow-up to 
the Borenstein and Rose’s work extends this impact to study price dispersion and finds that “an increase 
in a firm’s market power is expected to increase its ability to segment the market,” hence we could expect 
to see greater price dispersion in such markets (Gerardi and Shapiro 2007). 
Further, greater flight frequency has also been shown to lower frequency delay or the difference 
between a consumer’s preferred time and actual time of a flight (Douglas, et al. 1974), and is therefore 
considered to increase the value of services of an airline to a consumer.  This is presumably because 
consumers who value their time more highly (and hence who are willing to pay higher fares) are likely to 
find the greater number of options provided by an airline with a higher frequency on a given route more 
attractive than airlines with lower flight frequencies (Borenstein 1989).  Thus frequency is considered a 
measure of market power and should be accounted for in any firm-level analysis of price dispersion.  
Hypothesis 3: Greater market power provides increased ability to price discriminate, resulting in 
greater price dispersion. 
2.4 Advance purchase periods 
Reservation price is simply the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a good.  It is believed that 
consumers who purchase tickets closer to departure date are those with higher reservation prices for the 
trip.  While these consumer types may not be able to commit to a trip too far in advance, their opportunity 
costs (of not being able to make the trip) increase as the departure date approaches.  Airlines utilize this 
“valuation” of time to discriminate between consumer types and such segmentation serves to “weed out” 
consumers with high valuation of time (Stavins 2001).  Hence ticket prices are higher closer to the 
departure date, as most yield management algorithms (which also take into account seat availability) are 
programmed to take advantage of this difference in consumers’ reservation prices; “The common 
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mechanism used to segment customers in yield-management situations is the time of purchase; that is, the 
less price-sensitive customer generally waits until the last minute to make reservations. On the other hand, 
people who make their reservations early are generally more price sensitive; they are willing to trade 
away some flexibility for a reduced price” (Weatherford and Bodily 1992, p.832). 
While it is intuitive to see that prices will be higher when consumers’ reservation values are 
higher, we are interested in the nature of price dispersion within each ticket segment, i.e., are 7-day 
advance purchase ticket prices more or less dispersed than 21-day ticket prices?  In other words, while 7-
day advance purchase tickets may always be more expensive than 21-day advance purchase tickets, it is 
not necessary that all prices for 7-day advance purchase tickets be the same.  For example, if all 7-day 
purchase tickets in a market were priced at $700 and all 21-day purchases were $300, then there would no 
variance in prices within an advance purchase period.  On the other hand, it is also possible that prices for 
7-day tickets are more dispersed than 21-day ticket prices. Further, the nature of the dispersion within a 
particular advance purchase period may be different for business and leisure tickets.  Our goal is to 
account for such within-category price dispersion as well as to study the total dispersion in the market.  
Varian’s (1980) model of sales suggests that price dispersion will be greater in markets with 
higher reservation prices. The intuition behind this prediction is that firms will randomize their pricing 
strategy as long as there are consumers in the market who are not fully knowledgeable about the lowest 
prices available.   Such a randomized strategy will therefore be bounded by the maximum willingness to 
pay of the consumers in the market.  Because this upper bound is likely to be higher when consumers 
have high reservation prices, the range of prices offered in such markets is likely to be high as well.  
Recently Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) have empirically examined this proposition in online 
markets for electronic products.  Our goal is to examine whether this theoretical observation finds any 
support in online airline markets, where the presence of online travel agents that allow for easier search is 
a countervailing force that can potentially reduce the number of uninformed consumers.  
Hypothesis 4:  Price dispersion increases closer to flight departure.  
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2.5 Online price dispersion 
Information asymmetry, i.e. consumers’ inability to fully know and compare prices, is a well-known 
source of price dispersion.  For example, Varian (1980) suggests that price dispersion will persist when 
sellers intentionally vary prices over time so that consumers cannot learn about them (as long as there is 
some cost of acquiring price information). Salop and Stiglitz (1977) also note that the presence of at least 
some uninformed consumers ensures the existence price dispersion. While maintaining information 
asymmetry was perhaps easier in pre-Internet days, reduced search costs associated with online markets 
may make it difficult, perhaps even impossible, for price dispersion to exist. Bakos (1997) argues that 
lowered search costs on the Internet would decrease the ability of sellers to charge monopolistic prices. 
However, subsequent empirical work consistently finds prices on the Internet to be dispersed, whether in 
the market for books, CDs (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), tickets from online travel agents (Clemons, et 
al. 2002), or online brokerages (Chen and Hitt 2002).  These empirical findings suggest that online 
markets are not necessarily frictionless, and that all consumers are not perfectly aware of product and 
pricing characteristics. Hence even after accounting for extant sources of dispersion, we should find the 
persistence of price dispersion in online markets as well. 
Hypothesis 5:  We shall continue to observe dispersion of online prices even after accounting for 
extant sources of dispersion. 
2.6 Price-formats and Price Dispersion 
Most of the previously described theoretical models discuss pricing strategies for single-product firms, 
which set prices based purely on differences in consumers’ price knowledge and on competitors’ actions. 
However, in reality most firms sell a variety of products, and do not price them with a myopic view of 
achieving a one-time sale, or necessarily react to their competitor’s prices in a Bertrand-competition 
fashion.  For example, retailers sometimes use products as loss-leaders to attract consumers to buy their 
other products (Hess and Gerstner 1987). One pricing strategy, which encompasses a firms’ need to 
compete in multiple product markets on a long term basis and represent a firm’s overall approach to 
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pricing, is the creation and maintenance of a “price image” through price-formats.    
Previous research in marketing suggests that firms follow two basic price-formats, namely 
“Everyday Low Price” (EDLP) and “Promotional Pricing” (PROMO or HILO).  Although these formats 
are more appropriately regarded as a continuum rather than a dichotomy (Bell and Lattin 1998, Hoch, et 
al. 1994, Shankar and Bolton 2004), it is commonly agreed that EDLP sellers tend to charge relatively 
stable, below average prices with little or no temporary price discounts (Bell and Lattin 1998).  These 
sellers aim to credibly convey to consumers that they consistently offer low prices, hence sustaining this 
price image relies on both the magnitude and consistency of prices. On the other hand, HILO/PROMO 
sellers are promotion-oriented. Their prices are normally higher than the market average, but   are 
frequently accompanied by  promotions that permit prices on some products to be temporarily lower than 
EDLP prices (Lal and Rao 1997). Typically, HILO/PROMO firms maintain this price image by offering 
promotional prices on a small subset of featured items for a limited period of time. 
Because these complex price-formats can make it difficult for consumers to become informed 
about the true nature of prices, firms can target consumers based on their preferences and price 
knowledge (Blattberg, et al. 1981). While segmenting consumers based on their opportunity cost of time 
(Lal and Rao 1997, Ortmeyer, et al. 1991) or their basket size (Bell and Lattin 1998) are well-known 
short-term pricing tactics, price-knowledge based segmentation is perhaps most important in repeat-
purchase product categories. Indeed, these strategies are commonly observed amongst retailers and 
grocery stores, in which price-format significantly influences consumer decisions of where to shop and 
what to buy.  In the physical retail market, Wal-Mart is the most well known practitioner of EDLP; 
similarly in the U.S. domestic airline market, Southwest and JetBlue are known to have Every Day Low 
Prices while other airlines offer various forms of price-discounts and promotions consistent with the 
HILO strategy. 
Vendors’ conscious choice of particular pricing/segmentation strategies is likely to impact the 
distribution of prices in the market over and above other relevant factors. Research on Internet car 
retailing finds that prices obtained through Autobytel, a firm that targets consumers with high costs of 
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information gathering and bargaining, are both lower and exhibit smaller variance compared to those 
obtained through their competitors (Morton, et al. 2001, Zettelmeyer, et al. 2001).  Further, prior studies 
based on offline retail prices have documented significant differences in the range and variability in prices 
posted by sellers adopting different price-formats (Ho, et al. 1998, Shankar and Bolton 2004). Therefore, 
the distribution of ticket prices should display three distinct characteristics. First, the dispersion of prices 
for EDLP vendors should differ from that of non-EDLP vendors. Second, price dispersion in markets 
where all competitors have a single price-format will be different from those markets in which both 
strategies coexist. Third, the relatively stable prices posted by EDLP competitors increases the price 
knowledge of consumers, and restricts the extent to which non-EDLP firms in the same markets can 
price-discriminate among consumers. 
Hypothesis 6a:  The adoption of a particular price-format by an airline is an important source of 
price dispersion.  In particular, markets with the presence of EDLP carriers will exhibit lower 
price dispersion compared to markets with no EDLP carriers. 
Hypothesis 6b:  The prices of non-EDLP carriers in markets with EDLP competitors will be less 
dispersed relative to their prices in markets without EDLP carriers. 
3. Data and Method 
Our research is based on two datasets that contain price and detailed ticket information. The first contains 
prices and descriptions of airline tickets obtained from online travel agents as well as individual airline 
websites during the third quarter of 2004. This raw data was gathered by a web-based spider that we 
developed using Curl (a tool for scouring and extracting information from the Web) and later processed 
using a parser that we wrote using Perl and other database scripting languages.  
We consider homogenous categories of tickets commonly used by prior research on airline 
pricing in economics, namely coach-class, non-refundable, and round-trip tickets.  The prices cover one to 
four-week advance purchase tickets for both leisure tickets, in which a Saturday night stay is required, 
and for business tickets, with no weekend restriction.  The data pertain to the 500 busiest routes in the 
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U.S., resulting in a total of 1,137,500 individual tickets written by fourteen network carriers and three 
regional airlines that, together, account for over 86% of all domestic passenger enplanements in the U.S. 
To control for any possible price difference that may be attributed to differences in flight duration, 
number of connections for any given route, or departure and return schedules, only direct-flights are 
considered in our analyses.  Restricting our analysis to comparable tickets avoids the possibility of 
spurious effects being associated with the pricing strategy variable. Our final data set consists of 272,362 
unique observations3 .  The second dataset is based on the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) 
provided by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS).  The data is a sample of 10% of all airline 
tickets that originated in the U.S. on domestic carriers for the same quarter, allowing us to compare online 
and offline prices of the exact same carriers during the same time period as our online data collection.  
The total number of observations for non-stop, round-trip ticket in the second dataset is 209,273.  
Appendix A summarizes how the variables included in the models were operationalized.   
In the following section, we shall first discuss the three models that are used in this study; we 
then discuss the various measures of the dependent variables, and subsequently the details of our 
estimation method and results. 
3.1 Models 
Airline pricing data exhibits a three-level structure, consisting of tickets (level 1) nested within airlines 
(level 2) nested within markets (level 3). Due to the hierarchical nature of the data, two critical 
assumptions of OLS – independence and homoscedasticity of random errors – may not hold.  Hence, least 
squares regression is not an appropriate analysis technique. The unique cost structure and pricing strategy 
of each airline may result in its ticket prices in different routes to be correlated. This violation of the OLS 
assumption of independent errors, also known as Intra-Class Correlation (ICC), can cause the standard 
errors of the coefficients to be underestimated (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998), thus raising the risk of type-I 
                                                 
3 Tickets written by the three regional airlines (Sun Country, USA 3000, and Midwest Express) in our original data 
set have been excluded from the tables and subsequent analyses due to insufficient number of observations. 
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error (Pedhazur 1997).  Further, since unit-level random error varies across airlines, the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is also likely to be violated.   
To overcome these problems we analyze the data using the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
approach. Hierarchical linear models extend traditional regression models by accounting for the partial 
dependence of individual tickets within the same airline and also for tickets in one route being more 
similar than those belonging to another route.   This  approach has been recommended for the analysis of 
airline data by Borenstein and Rose (1994), as well as in a recent study of price dispersion by Venkatesan, 
Mehta and Bapna (2006), to simultaneously account for the correlation induced by retailer characteristics 
and product similarities.  Other researchers in IS (Ang, et al. 2002) have also used HLM when examining 
nested data such as when separating the effects of individual and institutional level predictors of 
compensation.  In describing our model-levels, we follow the approaches suggested by these extant works. 
In the subsequent discussions, we use subscript m to denote a market and subscript k to denote a 
carrier.  Model 1 addresses market-level price dispersion (dependent variable: mDisp ). We apply Model 1 
separately on the full set of data (all carriers) and a subset of data that includes only non-EDLP carriers to 
test hypotheses 6a and 6b, respectively. Model 2 is a firm-level analysis of the variance in prices of 
individual carriers within each market (dependent variable: varkmP ).   The goal of Model 2 is to 
specifically tease out the differences in the price variation of EDLP and non-EDLP carriers. Note that the 
data in Model 1 is aggregated across all tickets and carriers within each route, reducing the measures to 
level-3 units.  Since the hierarchical structure no longer exists in the market-level model, HLM is applied 
only for Model 2.  
Model 1 – Market-level price dispersion 
 m 1 2 3 4 m 5 m
6 m 7 m m
Disp DD7 DD14 DD21 shorthaul slot
mktcon EDLPmkt
α β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + +  (1) 
where  
 ( )2~ 0,m Nε σ  (2) 
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The dispersion measures in Model 1 are constructed for each market, m.  Estimation is carried out 
separately for both measures of dispersion, i.e. range and coefficient of variation. The independent 
variable EDLPmkt is introduced to identify markets where at least one of the EDLP carriers operates; 
other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. Since the unit of analysis is  the route  (i.e. one 
observation per route per week), level-2 control/explanatory variables (e.g. airline fixed-effect) are 
excluded from this model. 
Model 2 – Firm-level variance in prices 
Level 1 (Firm-Level) Model: 
 ( )2
km 0m 1m 2m 3m 4m km 5m km k0 km
km 0,
Pvar DD7 DD14 DD21 freq hub u
~ N σ
β β β β β β ε
ε
= + + + + + + +
 (3) 
Level 2 (Market-Level) Model: 
 0 00 01 02 03 0
1 5, 1 5,
m m m m m
m m
shorthaul slot mktcon uβ γ γ γ γ
β γ− −
= + + + +
=  (4) 
Model in the combined form: 
 km 01 m 02 m 03 m
10 20 30 40 km 50 km km
Pvar shorthaul slot mktcon
DD7 DD14 DD21 freq hub
α γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ ε
= + + +
+ + + + + +  (5) 
where  
 ( )
00 0 0
0 ~ 0,
k m
m
u u
u N
α γ
ϕ
= + +  (6) 
Consistent with Borenstein and Rose (1994), route effects ( 0mu ) are treated as random while airline 
effects ( 0ku ) are considered fixed. Similar to Clay et al. (2002), we infer the impact of the particular 
strategy followed by the EDLP carriers, Southwest and JetBlue, using the fixed effects for each airline. 
The dispersion measures in Model 2 are constructed for each unique firm-market pair, km. Note that since 
level-1 units (ticket-level) are aggregated in computing the dependent measures, the model exhibits a 2-
level (rather than 3-level) hierarchy. Again, estimation is carried out separately for both measures of 
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dispersion, i.e. range and coefficient of variation (calculated at the carrier-route level). Frequency in this 
model is defined as the weekly average number of actual flight departures per airline per route.  
3.2 Measuring Price Dispersion 
Our dependent variable for Model 1 is mDISP , i.e., dispersion of prices in a market.  There is a number of 
acceptable ways to measure price dispersion, though the most commonly used ones are the price range 
and the coefficient of variation (CV)4. These two measures have been widely used in prior research on 
price dispersion (Baye and Morgan 2004, Baye, et al. 2004, Baye, et al. 2006, Carlson and Pescatrice 
1980, Sorensen 2000). Although raw measures of variability such as variance and standard deviation have 
also been analyzed (Dahlby and West 1986, Pratt, et al. 1979), the scaled measure (CV), is superior 
because it can distinguish between two markets with the same variance in prices. In this situation, the CV 
will accurately reflect the higher price dispersion in the market with a lower average price relative to one 
in which the average price is higher. For the same reasons, we use CV to measure firm level price 
variance as well. Table 1 shows how the different firm- and market-level dispersion measures were 
operationalized in this study. 
Table 1: Dispersion Measures 
Unit of 
Analysis5 Measure Explanation 
max min
max min
km km
km
m m
price pricerange
price price
−= −
 
Standardized difference between the maximum and 
minimum prices available from carrier k in market 
(route) m  at period t . Firm-level 
Variance in 
Prices
( )kmPvar  
( )21 1
1
km
km
I
ikm km
ikm
km
km
I
km ikm
ikm
price price
I
CV  ,  
price
where price price  
I
−−=
=
∑
∑
 
Coefficient of variation of prices of a set of tickets 
kmI offered by carrier k  in market m  at period t . 
                                                 
4 In an empirical analysis of price dispersion in the airline industry, Borenstein and Rose (1994) report highly similar 
results based on dispersion measured with the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation.   
5 All dependent variable are measured at each time period t.  For simplicity in exposition, the subscript has been 
suppressed from all tables and models. 
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max minm m mrange price price= −  Raw range of prices of all tickets in a given in market m  at period t . Market-
level Price 
Dispersion 
( )mDisp  
( )21 1
1
m
m
I
im m
im
m
m
I
m im
im
price price
I
CV  ,  
price
where price price  
I
−−=
=
∑
∑
 Coefficient of variation of prices of a set of tickets 
mI  offered by all carriers in market m  at period t . 
3.3 Estimation and Results 
Two maximum likelihood methods are commonly used in estimating hierarchical linear models: the full 
maximum likelihood (ML) and the restricted maximum likelihood (REML). In ML, both fixed effects and 
variance components are included in the likelihood function. Variance-covariance parameters and second-
level fixed coefficients are estimated by maximizing the joint likelihood. In REML, variance-covariance 
components are first estimated with maximum likelihood that integrates over all possible values of the 
fixed effects, which are then recovered using generalized least square (GLS) given the variance-
covariance estimates obtained from the first step (Goldstein 1995, Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 
Raudenbush, et al. 2001).  REML minimizes the deviance of the least squares residuals as opposed to 
minimizing deviance of the data. 
We adopt REML to estimate our models because ML, though consistent and asymptotically 
efficient, does not adjust for the number of fixed effects that are being estimated.  As a result, the variance 
components will tend to be underestimated with small sample sizes or when the number of groups is 
small (Jones and Steenbergen 1997).  Although the source datasets used in this research do not fall into 
the “small sample size” category, our dependent variables are aggregated measures (i.e. range and 
coefficient of variation), which significantly reduce the number of observations in some of our analyses. 
Further, the use of REML is also consistent with a majority of previous research that has used the HLM 
approach.  
We present the summary statistics in Tables 2 and 3 for ticket prices at the individual airline level 
for online (posted) prices and transacted (DB1B) prices, respectively.   
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (Online Posted Prices) 
 MEAN STD Min Max Correlation Matrix 
Price 328.16 265.88 89 2959 1.00          
DD7 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.17 1.00         
DD14 0.25 0.43 0 1 -0.02 -0.33 1.00        
DD21 0.25 0.44 0 1 -0.08 -0.33 -0.34 1.00       
freq 43.34 39.54 0 192 -0.15 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.00      
hub 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.3 1.00     
shorthaul 0.37 0.48 0 1 -0.27 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.07 1.00    
slot 0.45 0.5 0 1 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.24 0.00 1.00   
mktcon 7.44 2.07 1 14 0.23 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.34 -0.09 -0.39 -0.1 1.00  
EDLPmkt 0.17 0.38 0 1 -0.27 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.34 -0.12 0.26 -0.27 -0.29 1.00 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics (Online plus Offline Transacted Prices – DB1B data) 
 MEAN STD Min Max Correlation Matrix 
Price 353.66 245.18 61 3275 1.00       
freq 43.34 39.54 0 192 0.05 1.00      
hub 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.16 0.30 1.00     
shorthaul 0.37 0.48 0 1 -0.12 0.13 -0.07 1.00    
slot 0.45 0.5 0 1 -0.07 -0.17 -0.24 0.00 1.00   
mktcon 7.44 2.07 1 14 0.08 -0.34 -0.09 -0.39 -0.1 1.00  
EDLPmkt 0.17 0.38 0 1 -0.15 0.34 -0.12 0.26 -0.27 -0.29 1.00 
 
First note that both the range (Max – Min) and mean of posted online prices (pooled across 
advance purchase periods) are lower than their transacted counterpart.  The transacted prices (DB1B data) 
are always pooled since there is no information available on advance purchase characteristics. Table 3 
reveals that correlations among the variables are low, ruling out concerns about multi-collinearity. 
Table 4: Market-level Online Price Dispersion 
Model 1 
BUSINESS LEISURE 
VARIABLES 
Range CV Range CV 
Intercept 0.1917 0.0299*** 29.4895 0.0860*** 
DD7 124.2662*** 0.0592*** 147.2428*** 0.0626*** 
DD14 49.5949*** 0.0391*** 118.8963*** 0.0675*** 
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DD21 28.4760* 0.0222** −0.6808 0.0033 
shorthaul −48.6108*** −0.0105 −70.1794*** −0.0106 
slot 43.3150*** 0.0355*** 33.3705** 0.0366*** 
mktcon 68.9733*** 0.0377*** 89.6429*** 0.0383*** 
EDLPmkt −74.7711*** −0.0194** −97.1278*** −0.0429*** 
−2LL 25569.5 −1820.4 26069.4 −1752.3 
BIC 25577 −1812.9 26077 −1744.8 
N 1864 1864 1867 1867 
 
Table 4 presents the main results from our analysis that examines market-level price dispersion 
for online prices as given by Model 1 (Table 7 does the same with DB1B data).  We can see a significant 
relationship between advance purchase requirements and price dispersion, with the exception of the 21-
day advance purchase period for leisure tickets.  Observe that the magnitudes of coefficients decrease 
with the number of days of advance purchase (i.e. coefficient of DD7 is greater than that of DD14, while 
the coefficient of DD14 is greater than that of DD216).  This finding suggests that compared to the base 
advance purchase period of 28-days, ticket prices become more and more dispersed as the departure date 
approaches.  Hence Hypothesis 4 is supported.  Consistent with the fact that consumers with higher 
opportunity costs (those who cannot always plan earlier) have higher reservation prices, we know that 
reservation prices are increasing towards flight departure as pre-planning becomes less constrained.  
Therefore while DD7 is representative of the market with the highest reservation prices, DD28 (base 
dummy) is representative of the market with the lowest reservation prices. Further, we conducted pair-
wise t-tests and confirmed that the intercepts and coefficients are statistically different for business and 
leisure tickets, thus providing support for Hypotheses 1.    
Note that both slot (a measure of resource scarcity) and mktcon (a measure of intensity of 
competition) are positively correlated with price dispersion for both types of tickets.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
6 T-tests confirm that the coefficients for DD7, DD14, and DD21 are statistically different within each ticket 
category. 
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ticket prices for routes shorter than 500 miles (shorthaul) are less dispersed than the market average in 
range, even if the same cannot be conclusively said for the CV measure.  Overall, these results provide 
general support for Hypothesis 2, which suggests that market characteristics are a source of price 
dispersion. Of particular interest to this research is the variable EDLPmkt which defines whether a market 
is served by an EDLP carrier.  The significant and negative sign indicates that whenever a market is 
served by one or more carriers that practice the EDLP price-format, the resulting prices in this market are 
less dispersed than others in which only non-EDLP carriers operate.  This provides strong support for 
Hypotheses 6a, which suggests that markets with EDLP carriers should exhibit lower price dispersion 
compared to other markets where EDLP carriers are absent.    
In addition to examining whether vendor pricing strategies impact the overall dispersion of prices 
in the market, results from Model 2 provide insights into how these strategies impact firm-level price 
dispersion. We interpret the results by considering a non-EDLP airline as the base and examine the 
coefficients of the fixed-effects for the two EDLP airlines. Table 5 shows that, even after controlling for 
all known market and ticket characteristics, both EDLP airlines exhibit lower variance in their price 
portfolio  (with the exception of one measure for JetBlue).   Note that the Department of Transportation 
defines seven airlines to be low-cost carriers based on their operational infrastructure, including the two 
EDLP practitioners Southwest and JetBlue, as well as others such as America West and AirTran.  
However, it is important to note that relative to other airlines, only the two EDLP airlines have negative 
coefficients for price dispersion (while the coefficients for other airlines are either insignificant or positive 
if significant).  This is perhaps sufficient evidence that market level dispersion of prices is a function of 
front-end pricing strategy rather than operational infrastructure alone.  While it may indeed be true that 
the two (back-end operations and front-end pricing) need to be aligned in order for a strategy to be 
successful, it is beyond the scope of the current paper to empirically examine this relationship. 
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Also note that in Hypothesis 3, consistent with prior research, we had suggested that market 
power (freq and hub7) is a source of price dispersion.  The firm-level analysis given by Model 2 supports 
this result across both ticket types and segments.   Note that the positive coefficients imply that greater the 
market power of firm, greater will be the variance in prices it offers. 
Table 5: Firm-level Variance in Online Prices of All (Both EDLP and non-EDLP) Carriers8 
Model 2  
BUSINESS LEISURE 
VARIABLES Range CV Range CV 
Intercept 0.9598*** 0.0408*** 0.9915*** 0.1344*** 
DD7 0.0602*** 0.0648*** 0.0039 0.0584*** 
DD14 0.0514*** 0.0431*** 0.0000 0.0577*** 
DD21 0.0278* 0.0259*** 0.0027 −0.0021 
freq 0.0020*** 0.0002* 0.0021*** 0.0000 
hub 0.0539*** 0.0213*** 0.0584*** 0.0135* 
shorthaul 0.0100 −0.0009 0.0422** 0.0059 
slot −0.0175 0.0256*** 0.0222 0.0330*** 
mktcon −0.1639*** 0.0071* −0.1527*** 0.0028 
EDLP1 (Southwest) −0.2356*** −0.0724*** −0.2093*** −0.1163*** 
EDLP2 (JetBlue) −0.1302*** −0.0285 −0.2219*** −0.0867*** 
−2LL 2501.4 −4562.7 1893.3 −3613.7 
BIC 2513.7 −4550.4 1905.6 −3601.4 
N 3592 3592 3600 3600 
*p<  0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< .01 (Same notation used for all tables) 
 
Another hypothesis (H6b) was that the presence of EDLP airlines may alter the pricing behavior 
of non-EDLP airlines, thus affecting the price dispersion in the market as a whole. To examine this 
question, we apply Model 1 to a subset of data that includes only non-EDLP carriers, and analyze the 
extent to which the dispersion in prices of these airlines varies with the presence or absence of EDLP 
competitors. The results are presented in Table 6.  We can observe that the coefficient for EDLPmkt is 
                                                 
7 At the time of our data collection, JetBlue Airways had two hub airports (JFK and LGB) while Southwest Airlines 
had six (ABQ, BNA, DAL, HOU, PHX, STL) in our sample.  Of the 500 routes in our sample, 65 routes include an 
airport that is a hub for either/both of the airlines.  
8 For parsimony, coefficients of other airline fixed effects and variance of market random effects are not reported.  
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both negative and significant, which suggests that non-EDLP carriers lower the range of their prices 
whenever they face EDLP competitors (though CV is not affected).  This finding provides direct support 
for Hypothesis 6b, and once again offers support to the intuition that practice of particular vendor pricing 
strategies is an important source of price dispersion in the marketplace (Hypothesis 6a).     
It is also interesting to note that while the presence of EDLP airlines impacts the price range, it 
does not have the same effect on the CV.  Perhaps one explanation for this observation is that price ranges 
are more subject to search technologies than price variances.  For example, through simple sorting a 
consumer might be able to find the lowest/highest prices in the market; and since EDLP prices are often 
used as reference prices (Blattberg, et al. 1995), non-EDLP carriers may want to appear in search results 
by providing greater discounts.  On the other hand, variance is reflective of overall prices in the market 
and is less easily processed by the consumer.   
Table 6: Market-level Dispersion in Online Prices offered by Non-EDLP Carriers 
BUSINESS LEISURE VARIABLES 
Range CV Range CV 
Intercept 1.9915 0.037*** 30.5176 0.0955*** 
DD7 141.2426*** 0.063*** 166.5061*** 0.0677*** 
DD14 55.9343*** 0.041*** 137.5549*** 0.0750*** 
DD21 31.4467* 0.023** −4.3803 −0.0013 
shorthaul −55.7507*** −0.003 −81.2292*** −0.0085 
slot 46.1849*** 0.039*** 33.8186** 0.0365*** 
mktcon 67.0064*** 0.032*** 86.1184*** 0.0328*** 
EDLPmkt −88.9240*** −0.010 −80.7096*** 0.0029 
−2LL 22081.4 −1428 22561.9 −1372.8 
BIC 22088.7 −1420.6 22569.3 −1365.5 
N 1593 1593 1601 1601 
 
We then conducted two similar market-level analyses with the DB1B data obtained from the U.S. 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  This data contains both online and offline prices and results of the 
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corresponding analyses are reported in Tables 7 and 8.  Note that in contrast to the online prices offered 
by the airlines which we analyzed previously, the current analysis relates to prices that were actually paid 
by consumers.  Results in Table 7 parallel those obtained from our previous analysis of posted prices: 
transacted prices in markets with EDLP carriers exhibit lower dispersion than in non-EDLP markets.  
Note that while the shorthaul variable continues to correlate negatively with price range, as in Table 4, it 
does not have a significant impact on CV. This suggests that the range of market-clearing prices is smaller 
for short-haul markets than for long-haul ones. Also, similar to the results for online posted prices, 
competition (mktcon) impacts both dispersion measures.  Interestingly, slot has no significant effect on 
dispersion in the transacted prices, implying that resource constraints have no significant impact on the 
dispersion of prices that clear the market. Note that while prior research has established the importance of 
this resource constraint in price dispersion, it has not offered any conclusive evidence of its impact on 
price dispersion.  
Table 7: Market-level Online and Offline (Transacted) 9  Price Dispersion 
VARIABLES Range CV 
Intercept 472.34*** 0.3817*** 
shorthaul -175.67*** 0.0143 
Slot -34.57  -0.006 
Mktcon 79.11*** 0.0170*** 
EDLPmkt -520.34*** -0.1904*** 
-2LL 7329.8 -528.3 
BIC 7335.9 -522.1 
N 486 486 
 
The results presented in Table 8 (below) are similar to those reported in Table 6 earlier, except 
that non-EDLP transacted prices are analyzed instead of posted prices. Consistent with our earlier 
                                                 
9 Since there is no information on the timing of ticket purchase (number of days prior to departure) in the DB1B 
data, all advance purchase dummies (DD7, DD14, DD21) and Saturday night stay-over restriction (business vs. 
leisure) are excluded from analyses with this data. 
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findings for online posted prices, the negative coefficient of the EDLPmkt variable implies that even non-
EDLP carriers tighten their price range and lower their CV in the presence of EDLP competitors.   
Table 8: Market-level Dispersion in Online and Offline (Transacted) Prices, Non-EDLP Carriers  
VARIABLES Range CV 
Intercept 857.89*** 0.5121*** 
shorthaul -441.58*** -0.0050 
slot -96.82* -0.0094 
mktcon 152.29*** -0.0104 
EDLPmkt -284.51*** -0.0990*** 
-2LL 6240.8 -389.7 
BIC 6246.8 -383.7 
N 486 486 
 
3.4 Comparing posted and transacted prices 
Note that the government-maintained DB1B data does not have all the variables that are in our 
self-acquired dataset (posted online prices). The DB1B does not contain advance purchase period 
information nor does it explicitly identify the channel (online vs. offline) in which the ticket was 
purchased. Therefore we remove these identifiers from the posted price dataset to create a new datset that 
is reasonably comparable to the DB1B counterpart.  We carried out t-tests to examine whether the range 
and CV of prices for each carrier-route observation in the two data sets were the same. We find that the 
range of prices of the posted (online only) tickets is smaller than the range of transacted prices (i.e., a mix 
of online and offline tickets) 80% of the time.  Similarly, we find that the CV of the former is smaller than 
in the latter dataset 83% of the time. All findings are statistically significant at the 99.99% confidence 
level. We also repeated this analysis using random samples consisting of about 25% of the observations in 
each dataset and got similar results. 
 While we cannot make conclusive statements on online versus offline dispersion from this 
finding (since the datasets are not perfectly comparable), the results do provide some indication that 
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offline prices may be less dispersed than online prices.  The logic underlying this assertion is as follows. 
First note that transacted prices must be a subset of posted prices because only a portion of the posted 
prices will clear.   Because we find transacted prices to have a higher range, variance and coefficient of 
variance than the posted prices, and because posted prices are come purely from online sources  while the 
transacted prices are a mix of online and offline, this suggests that the additional dispersion in prices is 
likely to have been introduced by the offline component.  However, while this analysis is suggestive a 
conclusive analysis would require a more granular dataset. 
Finally, Hypothesis 5 is supported by our analysis. Because in spite of including other known 
explanatory factors, no model of online prices fully accounts for all the dispersion in online prices, i.e., 
the residuals remain significant. This can also be verified by examining the pseudo R-square. The 
persistence of price dispersion in online markets goes against the notion that online search costs are zero 
but lend support to the view that online markets do have nonzero frictional costs (Hann and Terwiesch 
2003). Also note that we are the first to simultaneously examine dispersion in both posted and transacted 
prices across the same set of firms. We find dispersion in posted as well as transacted prices. The 
dispersion in posted prices reflects vendors’ price discrimination strategy, while the dispersion in 
transacted prices confirms that these posted prices do clear the market. This suggests that the price 
discrimination strategies are successful and that not all consumers are informed about all prices. The 
results from our analyses in this study are summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9: Summary of Analyses and Results 
Hypothesis Variables Online Data DB1B Data 
H1: Different ticket categories 
(business vs. leisure) exhibit 
different levels of dispersion 
Online data set (posted 
prices), segmented by 
weekend stay-over 
restriction 
Yes 
(Table 4) N/A 
H2: Market characteristics of a 
route are a source of price 
dispersion. 
Market concentration, 
Slot, Distance 
(mktcon, slot, shorthaul) 
Yes+ 
(Table 4) 
Yes+* 
(Table 7) 
H3: Market power of the airline is 
a source of price dispersion. 
Hub, Frequency 
(hub, freq) 
Yes 
(Table 5) N/A 
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H4: Price dispersion increases 
closer to flight departure. 
Advance purchase 
(DD7, DD14, DD21) 
Yes++ 
 (Tables 4 and 6) N/A 
H5: Online price dispersion 
cannot be fully explained even 
after accounting for extant 
sources of dispersion 
Online data set  
(posted prices) 
Yes 
(Table 4) 
H6a: Markets in which EDLP 
carriers are present exhibit lower 
price dispersion compared to 
those without EDLP carriers 
 
H6b: Prices of tickets offered by 
non-EDLP carrier are less 
dispersed in markets where EDLP 
carriers are present compared to 
those without EDLP carriers 
EDLP markets 
(EDLPmkt) 
Yes** 
(Tables 4 and 6) 
Yes 
(Tables 7 and 8) 
+ shorthaul not significant for CV, *Slot not significant, ++DD21 for leisure tickets not significant 
** Except for CV 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
Research in economics has strived to identify and explain the many sources of price dispersion even when 
some leading theorists have consistently warned that not all of price dispersion is necessarily explainable.  
More recently this topic has been raised again by the expanding scope of electronic markets and the 
prevailing misconception that online markets will lead to convergence of prices. Our research is 
motivated by both the theoretical interests that surround this problem of price dispersion, as well as the 
need to empirically explain and reconcile the findings in online marketplaces.   
Most of the discussions on online markets generally portray a marketplace dominated by 
consumers, in which negligible search costs are purported to reduce vendors to compete in the Bertrand 
equilibrium fashion.  However, the empirical reality does not match these observations. First, even for the 
same product, it is possible to observe a wide range of prices in both online and offline markets. Second, 
rarely do vendors adjust the prices of each and every one of their goods in reaction to competitor pricing 
and/or consumer search costs.  Indeed, both theoretical and empirical research in marketing suggests that 
conveying and maintaining a certain image to consumers is as much a part of pricing as economic factors 
such as costs, market characteristics, and competitor strategies are – price can be a vehicle to convey a 
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message, and price-format is one common way through which it is accomplished. Therefore, if indeed 
price-format is an integral part of a firm’s conscious branding strategy, then its influence should be 
evident in any distribution of prices at the market level.   Hence it is one of our goals in this paper to 
examine the role of vendors’ price-format strategies on price dispersion. 
The empirical setting that we analyze in this study is the domestic airline market in the U.S. We 
choose the airline industry for a number of reasons: First, it is a well studied industry that has identified 
innumerable sources of dispersion in economics. Hence our demonstration of price-format strategy as a 
source of dispersion will be sound if this variable remains a significant factor in explaining dispersion of 
prices in the market even after accounting for other sources from prior research.  Second, the availability 
of online and offline prices for the same set of firms represent an improvement over previous research in 
which different sets of firms provided online and offline prices. Third, this setting provides us an 
opportunity to acquire both posted and transacted prices.  While research in economics has generally used 
transacted prices to study dispersion, IS research has generally used posted prices. Combining the two 
gives us the opportunity to see if pricing strategies employed (as gleaned from posted prices) by the firms 
do end up clearing when consumers eventually purchase (as can be understood from transacted prices). 
Our results control for and verify the role of factors established by prior research on airline price 
dispersion.  Since the roles of these variables have been elaborated upon earlier, we focus on our new 
findings here. First, we examine whether price dispersion is significantly different in markets where 
EDLP airlines operate compared to markets in which only non-EDLP carriers compete. We find that 
indeed dispersion of prices, in terms of both range and CV, are lower in the former. Second, we 
investigate why these markets have lower dispersions – which could potentially stem from a combination 
of two occurrences: EDLP firms directly reducing down the dispersion of the prices in the market, or their 
existence affect the competitive behaviors of other firms so that these firms lower their price variance as 
well.  Hence we ascertain whether there is a distinct difference in the variance of prices set by EDLP and 
non-EDLP firms.   Our results show that: 1) The range and CV of prices offered by EDLP firms are 
indeed lower than those of their non-EDLP counterparts; 2) the range and CV of prices offered by non-
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EDLP firms are lower in markets with EDLP competitors than in markets where these competitors are 
absent.  Hence our hypothesis that pricing strategy through price-formats is a source of price dispersion is 
supported.  An important managerial implication of our findings is that non-EDLP competitors will not 
shy away from imitating the EDLP firms when faced with this type of competition. 
While theories of online search have suggested price convergence, we know that price dispersion 
persists even in mature markets (Ratchford, et al. 2003). Consistent with these early findings, and more 
recent work that re-affirms the existence of online price dispersion (Walter, et al. 2006), our analysis also 
find evidence of price dispersion online. 
Prices closer to departure date are higher as they are specifically targeted towards consumers with 
greater opportunity cost of time. An important finding of our paper is that price dispersion is also 
increasing closer to departure date. There are two possible reasons: First, higher reservation price implies 
higher upper bound for prices and thus the possibility of price offerings is higher. Second, price 
insensitive consumers (often corporate travelers) are also perhaps less inclined to search for fares and 
hence may be unless informed about the entire distribution of prices in the market. Both these reasons 
resonate with Varian’s (1980) observation that price dispersion increases with reservation prices and the 
proportion of uninformed consumers  
Finally, we are also in a unique position to compare the dispersion of posted and transacted prices.  
Our own data and that of DB1B suggest that EDLPs only offer the lowest prices in the market about 50% 
of the time. In other words, these firms appear to maintain their price image not necessarily focusing on 
the “Low Price” component alone but they also strategically manipulate their “EveryDay” or consistency 
component. But, decreased search costs online could potentially lead EDLP airlines to be “found out,” i.e., 
their low price image could take a beating if their prices were always compared to lower promotional 
prices from a non-EDLP airline. However, in contrast, our research shows that the EDLP prices do clear 
in the marketplace, suggesting that price-format strategies do work even in online markets. This 
observation has implications for other non-airline vendors such as Wal-Mart, which practice EDLP 
strategy offline. Our findings would suggest that Wal-Mart need not significantly alter its online practices 
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to be competitive with exclusively online retailers like Amazon.com and others.  While further 
examination of firm-specific category-level analysis is warranted, it may very well be that firms 
selectively employ EDLP strategy or perhaps even vary in the degree to which they practice EDLP across 
product categories. 
It is interesting to observe that EDLP airlines do not list themselves with any of the Online Travel 
Agencies thus avoiding making themselves vulnerable to easy price comparisons10. This means that while 
firms such as Target.com co-list their products on Amazon.com’s marketplace and allow purchase 
through Google’s payment system, it may not be wise for Wal-Mart to pursue such a strategy simply to 
expand their potential market base. Rather, it may be better off by operating independently and 
minimizing price comparisons. 
4.1 Limitations and future research 
The main limitations of our work stem from the data collected by the government on transacted prices.  
While we were able to acquire data on posted prices where we could categorize by weeks of advance 
purchase and weekend stay-over restrictions, this information is not available in the data put forth by the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Hence a one-to-one comparison of posted and transacted tickets is not 
possible.  Further, the BTS data does not identify the actual channel of ticket purchase, if it was bought 
through a travel agent or purchased from an airline website. This once again limits some of our 
comparisons, since for the posted prices (which we collect ourselves) we do know if the ticket prices 
actually came from an airline’s own Web-site or from an online travel agent. We also do not possess any 
data on frequent fliers and loyalty card holders for the different airlines; clearly there will be a 
predisposition of these consumer types towards particular airlines, which may in turn affect pricing 
strategies.  Availability of more detailed data could lead to interesting extensions including estimation of 
search costs. 
                                                 
10 We would like to thank one of the reviewers for encouraging us to explore this aspect further. 
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The current paper focuses on understanding market level dispersion of prices.  However, many 
interesting questions with regards to a firm’s strategic practice of its price-format strategy remain 
unexplored, particularly in the online context.  A possible extension to this work is to investigate how 
firms may strategically vary their practice of price-formats in different markets or for different product 
categories. There is also a limited amount of empirical work that co-examines the front-end pricing 
strategy and the back-end operational aspects of airline operations.  We may have an opportunity to 
empirically examine whether EDLP airlines possess a particular cost structure, and how this may play a 
role in an airline’s decision on price-format adoption and pricing.  
Appendix A: Description of Variables 
Factor Variable Related Literature Explanation 
Ticket 
Categories & 
Consumer 
Segments 
Business/ Leisure 
tickets (weekend 
stay-over 
requirement)  
 
Number of days 
of advance 
purchase 
(DD7, DD14, 
DD21) 
(Clemons, et al. 
2002, Dana 1998, 
Gale and Holmes 
1993, Stavins 
2001) 
DD7 =   1 if observed ticket is generated within 0-7 days of departure date ; 0 otherwise. 
DD14 = 1 if observed ticket is generated within 7-14 days of departure date ; 0 otherwise. 
DD21 = 1 if observed ticket is generated within 14-21 days of departure date ; 0 otherwise. 
 
Baseline comparison is DD28 (tickets generated four weeks and beyond from the date of 
departure).  
Market 
concentration 
(mktcon) 
(Brueckner et al. 
1992; Hayes and 
Ross 1998, Stavins 
2001) 
mktcon is the total number of airlines offering services (non-stop or indirect) in the observed 
route. 
Slot- 
constrained 
airports  
(slot) 
(Berry, et al. 1997, 
Stavins 2001, 
Morrison and 
Winston 1990) 
slot = 1 if either or both origin and destination airports on the observed route are slot-controlled; 0 
otherwise. 
Distance 
(shorthaul) 
(Berry, et al. 1997, 
Borenstein 1989, 
Hayes and Ross 
1998, Stavins 
2001) 
shorthaul = 1 if the non-stop distance between origin and destination airports on the observed 
route is equal to or less than 500 miles; 0 otherwise. 
Market 
Characteristics 
EDLP market 
(EDLPmkt) New variable EDLPmkt = 1 if the market is served by EDLP carriers (Southwest and/or JetBlue). 
Hub  
(hub) 
(Berry et al. 1997; 
Borenstein 
1989,1991; Hayes 
and Ross 1998) 
hub = 1 if the origin and/or destination airport(s) in a given route is (are) a hub(s) for an airline 
offering the ticket; 0 otherwise. 
Market 
Power 
Frequency  
(freq) 
(Borenstein and 
Rose 1994, Hayes 
and Ross 1998) 
freq is the weekly average number of flights scheduled for departure from the origin to destination 
on a given route by the carrier writing the ticket. 
Price-format  EDLP New variable EDLP = 1 if the ticket is written by a carrier adopting the “everyday low price” strategy (Southwest or JetBlue); 0 otherwise. 
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